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Entrepreneurship in Off-Label Drug
Prescription: Just What the Doctor Ordered!
Raymond J. March
Texas Tech University

______________________________________________________
Abstract
This paper finds that physicians and pharmaceutical companies working as
entrepreneurial actors were able to better serve patients by finding effective
alternative uses of three drugs. I examine off-label drug prescription within
an entrepreneurial framework by examining the development processes of
aspirin, Viagra, and minoxidil. In each case, the medical community reached
research and treatment conclusions quicker than the FDA did. These
examples provide counterevidence to the view that off-label prescription is
reckless and requires additional governmental oversight due to a lack of
sufficient testing.

______________________________________________________
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I. Introduction
Any legally prescribed drug in the United States must undergo a
lengthy, costly, and uncertain process enforced by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). The time between drug discovery and
approval averages sixteen years, and the probability of approval for
human use is approximately 10 percent (Stossel 2015). Completing
this approval process requires an average investment of $403 million
(Demasi, Hansen, and Grabowoski 2003).1 The high cost of FDA
drug approval creates significant barriers to entry and reduces the
number of pharmaceuticals available to consumers (Tabarrok 2000,
2009). Physicians are left with few options to serve patients (Benson
2004).
Despite these high barriers to entry, physicians can exercise an
entrepreneurial role in their practices by prescribing and
recommending pharmaceuticals off-label. As noted by Salbu (1999),
The authors provide this estimate in 2000 dollars. In 2016 dollars, $403 million is
approximately $560 million.

1
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the FDA’s authority to regulate the pharmaceutical market only
extends to approval for human use for a specific condition. The FDA
does not have the authority to tell doctors what an approved drug
can be prescribed or used for. Off-label prescription, by some
estimates, accounts for 25 percent of all prescriptions, (Leibman
2003) but can be significantly higher for certain conditions.
Although off-label prescribing is common, many consumers,
physicians, and other medical professionals believe that unregulated
off-label prescription is reckless and requires additional FDA
oversight (Stafford 2008; Dresser and Frader 2009; Buppert 2012;
Howard and Copland 2013). A common assumption in proregulation
literature is that prescribing pharmaceuticals outside of the FDA’s
scope of approved uses is unsafe and, because the evidence is
insufficient to demonstrate safe use, prescribing for off-label uses is
negligent. Despite a circuit court decision that promoting off-label
uses of pharmaceuticals by manufacturers is protected under the First
Amendment,2 the FDA has recently engaged in efforts to more
narrowly construe the definition of “promotion.” This effort results
in less information available for physicians to find effective ways to
treat patients.
Physician Randall Stafford believes off-label prescription needs
greater FDA oversight. He writes, “Evidence regarding the efficacy
and safety of off-label use is nearly always inferior to that required by
the FDA in approving a product for its intended calculation” (2012,
p. 291). Stafford concludes that the FDA may need to increase its
mandate to monitor off-label drug prescription better. Radley,
Finkelstien, and Stafford (2006) call for policy makers to “consider
strategies for mandatory post-approval surveillance that focus on
curtailing off-label practices” (p. 1026). Public opinion has
demonized off-label prescription to an extent where, according to the
Consumers Union, “Most of those [off-label uses] are for a use that
lacks any evidence or rigorous study to back it up” (emphasis original) (2007,
p. 1).
The critical question is, Who is better suited to find effective and
safe alternative uses for existing drugs and who can find them
promptly: the bureaucratic FDA or the entrepreneurial physicians
and pharmaceutical companies? This paper holds that the
entrepreneurial actions taken by physicians and pharmaceutical
companies through the market in a comparatively less-regulated area
2

See United States v. Alfred Caronia.
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of healthcare serve patients better, expand medical knowledge, and
increase treatment options in a more effective manner than the FDA
approval method does. To bolster this claim, this paper uses three
case studies: the use of aspirin for cardiovascular health, the
development of sexual pharmacology and Viagra, and the use of
minoxidil to treat hair loss. In these case studies, physicians and
pharmaceutical companies attained new medical knowledge and
effectively treated patients by acting entrepreneurially through the
market process. This entrepreneurship developed research and
effective treatment more efficiently than the FDA’s approval process
did.
The next section examines the entrepreneurial framework for the
off-label drug prescription market. The paper then uses this
framework to examine each case study mentioned above. I conclude
by examining the implications of the potential for entrepreneurial
activity in the pharmaceutical market and by providing directions for
future research.
II. Off-Label Prescriptions, Entrepreneurship, and the Market
Process
The entrepreneur serves as a unique economic actor who determines
“what resources should be used, and/or what goods should be
produced” (Kirzner 1963, p. 13). For an entrepreneur’s product or
service to remain on the market, it must provide a benefit that
consumers consider greater than the price (Lewin 2015). The
entrepreneur’s ability to perform this role depends on the number of
restrictions placed on using their means to create products and
services to exchange with consumers (Kirzner 1978). When
consumers and entrepreneurs engage in buying and selling, a market
process develops where inefficient or ineffective uses of resources to
produce products create losses, and those products that add value to
customers’ lives produce profits for the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs
seek profits through competition to provide the best product
possible.
The profit-and-loss system plays an informational role, guiding
entrepreneurs to distribute scarce resources to their highest desired
uses (Hayek 1945; Mises 1952). Profits provide information that the
consumer values the product, and losses provide information that the
consumer values the product less than other products whose sales
earned profits. Reducing the uncertainty of what consumers are
willing to purchase requires constant discovery and innovation from
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entrepreneurs, with consumers determining which products are
valued and should continue being produced (Mises 1949). Those
entrepreneurs who earn profits do so by effectively competing
against other entrepreneurs (Kirzner 1974).
Competition among physicians, according to Phelps (2010), can
be categorized as competition for correctly diagnosing patients and
providing effective treatments. When common treatment methods
fail, or no common and consistent treatments exist, a physician must
be alert to treatment options that other doctors may not be aware of
to compete on the treatment margin. Physicians who are better able
to accurately assess alternative uses of pharmaceuticals and effectively
evaluate the risk of less-common treatment options are better able to
serve patients.3
Despite operating in a highly regulated market, there is evidence
that physicians act entrepreneurially. By empirically assessing the
relationship between physician concentration and economic growth
at the state level, Reilly and Santerre (2013) find evidence that
physicians in general act in a profit-seeking manner (in contrast to a
rent-seeking manner). Other evidence suggests that physicians are
responsive to their patients’ desires. Schaumans (2015) reports that
general practitioners facing more competition prescribed more
medication in order to satisfy patients’ expectations. Austin and
Baker (2015) find that higher concentrations of physician practices
are associated with lower prices paid by their patients for various
common procedures. McCarthy (1985) finds that the market for
primary care physicians is “reasonably characterized by market
competition” (p. 93). Similarly, Dunn and Shapiro (2015) find that a
one-standard-deviation increase in cardiologist concentration is
associated with a 5 percent increase in cardiologist service provision
and fewer overall remissions.
A competitive environment in conjunction with limited
restrictions on off-label prescribing allows physicians to allocate
means to desired ends through finding alternative uses for resources
(pharmaceuticals) that are most valued by consumers (patients). In
short, when commonly used pharmaceuticals fail to treat the patients
or when a commonly used pharmaceutical treatment is unavailable,
the physician is performing the entrepreneurial act of determining
what resources should be used to treat the patient.
3 This adjustment process pushes the market for treatment toward an equilibrium
where existing pharmaceuticals are prescribed for their highest desired use. For a
more detailed account of this process, see Boettke and D’Amico (2010).
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Although the transaction costs of switching physicians can be
significant, physicians’ services are subject to the wishes of patients,
who may decide to switch when they feel a physician’s service was
inadequate (Harris 2003; Tai-Seale and Pescosolido 2003; Fiscella et
al. 2004). Patients may also review their physician online. These
reviews, according to Segal (2012), can either “create significant
reputational damage” or “help promote one’s practice” (p. 341). As
of 2012, over eighty websites exist where patients can review their
physicians (Segal 2012), and an estimated 21 percent of patients read
online reviews of physicians (Gay and Pho 2013). Given patients’
heterogeneous expectations when obtaining medical services
(Feldstein 1986), a physician’s willingness to prescribe drugs off-label
to provide treatment where typical treatment methods have failed
could positively affect reputation and allow that physician to
outcompete other physicians who are less willing to prescribe offlabel.
Pharmaceutical companies also serve an entrepreneurial role in
the prescription drug market through researching and developing
alternative uses of currently manufactured drugs. This process (often
called drug repurposing or drug repositioning) allows pharmaceutical
companies to economize on previous testing (Pollack 2014; Tobinick
2009) and tailor existing drugs to serve patients’ needs better
(Ashburn and Thor 2004). Expanding the serviceability of an already
approved pharmaceutical allows companies to obtain more profits by
extending their market to include additional customers (patients) with
additional conditions or ailments. As noted by Ashburn and Thor
(2004), the idea to repurpose pharmaceuticals can originate from
fortuitous observation, keen insight, or technology platforms
developed to determine available opportunities.
In the medical field, information generated by the market process
is distributed in medical journals. According to Wittich,
Burkle, and Lanier, (2012) “Reports on OLDU [off-label drug
usage], particularly original observations, are not only tolerated by
indexed medical journals but also may actually be encouraged” (p.
987). The information collected in these journals is so critical for
physicians that “articles may not only become accepted for
publication but may also get journal promotion (editorials and media
promotion) reserved for the highest-priority articles” (p. 987).
Although the complex payment system faced by physicians can lead
to market distortions in the allocation of medical goods (Goodman
2012; McGuff and Murphy 2015), medical journals still provide
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physicians and pharmaceutical companies with information regarding
how pharmaceuticals are effectively treating patients.4
III. Aspirin and Cardiovascular Well-Being
Although historians believe that acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin in herbal
form) was first used to alleviate pain as early as 1453 BC (Fuster and
Sweeney 2011), the use of aspirin for other purposes is comparatively
recent. As early as 1966, aspirin was called “the wonder drug that
nobody understands” in the New York Times (Boehm 1966, p. 1). In
the 1940s, physicians began theorizing that aspirin might be
serviceable in cardiology when it was observed that children given
aspirin-laced chewing gum after a tonsillectomy bled more than those
who did not receive the gum. If aspirin caused bleeding, it could also
prevent clotting, a common cause of heart attacks.
This hypothesis was originally put forth by physician Laurence
Craven, who published two papers testing aspirin’s ability to reduce
heart attack risk. These papers contained the results of experiments
conducted with overweight men ages 45 through 65 who elected to
take a daily dose of aspirin to mitigate heart attack risk. In both
experiments, no participants experienced a heart attack. Craven’s
work promoted the off-label use of aspirin by other physicians who
“enjoyed similar successful results in the administration of aspirin for
prevention of coronary thrombosis in their own practices” (Craven
1950, p. 48).
Despite evidence supporting Craven’s hypothesis, aspirin’s use to
promote cardiovascular health was met with skepticism from some in
the medical profession. As noted by Miner and Hoffhines, “Most of
Craven’s writing is speculative and descriptive, lacking any statistics
or formal presentation of data” (2007, p. 182). Much of this
4 Payment arrangements between pharmaceutical companies, health insurance
companies, and physicians can complicate which pharmaceuticals are prescribed.
FDA approval may also affect a physician’s comfort with prescribing a
pharmaceutical for a particular use. However, payment systems may also work to
promote newly found uses for pharmaceuticals. For example, as part of its
promotion strategy, Pfizer issued payments to physicians to act as consultants and
deliver public lectures to promote the newly found treatment (Lexchin 2006).
Although this type of interaction between physicians and pharmaceutical
companies would likely concern those who believe that more regulation of off-label
drug prescription is desirable, it is unlikely that these interactions would occur for
pharmaceuticals with harmful side effects or spurious treatment results. These
promotional efforts are costly and would likely lead to reputational damage or legal
penalties for the manufacturer.
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skepticism and criticism was put to rest in the mid-1970s. In 1974,
the Canadian Cooperative Study Group found that “aspirin reduced
the risk of continuing ischemic attacks, stroke or death by 19
percent” and “also reduced risk for the ‘harder,’ more important
events of stroke or death by 31 percent” (1978, p. 53). Further
studies confirming aspirin’s effectiveness in reducing blood clotting
soon followed (Passamani 1980; Candelise et al. 1982).
The use of aspirin to prevent heart attacks and promote
cardiovascular well-being would remain off-label until the FDA
officially approved aspirin for a suspected myocardial infarction in
1996. This was approximately forty-six years after physicians began
prescribing it for cardiovascular health. Despite physicians commonly
recommending taking aspirin daily to prevent heart attacks or combat
cardiovascular conditions, the FDA has still not approved aspirin for
this use.
The absence of FDA approval has not deterred physicians from
recommending aspirin’s off-label use to prevent critical
cardiovascular issues. Although taking aspirin daily could potentially
have harmful side effects (Kormos 2013; Bundhun et al. 2016) and
cardiovascular medication has improved since Craven’s
entrepreneurship, aspirin remains a commonly accepted treatment for
a variety of cardiovascular conditions today. Dr. Carl Pepine,
codirector of cardiovascular medicine at the University of Florida,
estimated that approximately 10,000 deaths could be prevented a year
by taking a daily dose of aspirin (Ross 1996). Dr. Deepak Bhatt,
professor of medicine at Harvard University, espoused the views of
many physicians when he said that barring special circumstances, “if
somebody already has evidence of cardiovascular disease, there’s no
question they should be on an aspirin” (2012, p. 5).
Craven’s work demonstrates the discovery process, which
emerged as a result of experimenting based on knowledge developed
from previous treatment. Other physicians were able to capitalize on
this knowledge and offer effective treatment for their patients. The
entrepreneurial actions of Craven and other physicians have helped
countless individuals avoid or reduce the risk of a heart attack and
combat other serious heart conditions.
IV. Sexual Pharmacology and Viagra
According to the School of Public Health at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, nearly 60 percent of men in their sixties suffer
from impotence (2016). Despite the frequency of impotence,
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treatment was historically overlooked by the medical community. The
development of sexual pharmacology and the resulting creation of
Viagra emerged from a market process in which physicians
fundamentally changed the way impotence was medically understood
and how to treat it.
The medical community began viewing sexual dysfunction as a
condition requiring research in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At this
time, sexual dysfunction, including impotence, was considered a
psychological (in contrast to a physiological) issue. As a result, those
suffering from sexual dysfunction were limited to psychoeducation
and behavioral therapy for treatment (Tiefer 2006; Maggi et al. 2000).
Unfortunately, little innovation or discovery was attempted to better
serve patients with impotence. These treatments were the only ones
available until the late 1970s (Tiefer 2006).5
In 1978, entrepreneurial urologists met in New York City to
discuss the physiology of an erection. The innovation and discovery
that emerged from that meeting “became the turning point, changing
forever the old, erroneous way of thinking of impotence as being
exclusively a psychogenic [psychological] problem” (Wagner and
Kaplan 1993, p. 22). Physicians accepted the challenge to change the
understanding and treatment of impotence on a global scale. In 1982,
the Society for Impotence Research formed to distribute information
and research findings related to advancing this new theory. The
organization quickly developed regional chapters in Europe, Asia,
and Latin America and began publishing half a dozen specialized
medical journals (Tiefer 2006).
Advances in medical research bolstered innovations in impotence
treatment. By the mid-1980s, a small group of entrepreneurial
urologists discovered drugs that produced erections. Wagner and
Kaplan (1993) note that some of these injections “were well known,
older compounds that had been registered and marketed for other
purposes [making them off-label]” (p. 49). Wagner and Kaplan
continue, “There appeared to be no hurry as the patents for these
drugs were old and the size of the market was not known with any
precision” (p. 49). The entrepreneurial alertness of these urologists
created the nascent field of sexual pharmacology.
Tests for the injectable treatment primarily consisted of
volunteers. However, physicians self-testing these serums were not
unheard of (Tiefer 2006). In some cases, volunteers in clinical trials
5

The rare exception at this time was patients receiving penile prosthetics.
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gave injections to themselves over the course of months with few
complications (Zorgniotti and Lefleur 1985). By the mid-1980s,
ample evidence supported the effectiveness of solution injections to
treat impotence (Virag et al. 1984; Virag 1985; Sidi et al. 1986). Soon,
injection became a preferred method of treatment for patients with
impotence. Despite its accepted effectiveness and commonality of
usage, the FDA would not approve any injection serum for the
treatment of impotence until 1995. Approval came approximately
fifteen years after evidence from the medical community indicated
that injectable treatment options were reliable and effective.
Although unintentional, in 1989, another key discovery drastically
changed the market for impotence treatment. During the late 1980s,
scientists Peter Dunn and Albert Wood began clinical trials for a
hypertension drug called sildenafil citrate (what would become
Viagra). During a testing phase involving older volunteers, the
volunteers reported few beneficial effects on their blood pressure but
noticeable increases in the duration and firmness of their erections.
Pfizer, the producer of Viagra, “did not immediately realize they had
a blockbuster on their hands, but when a member of the team read a
report that identified PDE5 [an enzyme that can help procure
erections] . . . a trial in impotent men was quickly set up” (Ashburn
and Thor 2004, p. 676). Dunn and Wood’s discovery would
eventually introduce a new oral medication option to the market for
impotence treatment. The FDA’s approval of Viagra for impotence
treatment would not occur for nearly ten years despite Viagra’s
standing as the most common method to treat impotence during this
period.
The emergence of sexual pharmacology and the development of
Viagra to treat impotence is another example of off-label prescription
as a way entrepreneurial physicians (mostly urologists) and
pharmaceutical companies discovered more effective ways to treat
patients. This example began with physicians experimenting with an
entirely different method of treatment. The discovery process of
research developed within a network of entrepreneurial urologists led
to experimenting by using off-label serums to treat impotence. The
success of these experiments would help develop the market for
impotence treatment and replace treatment options of lesser quality.
Oral medication would eventually become the most common method
for treating impotence with the development of Viagra by Pfizer,
which acted entrepreneurially on the unintended findings of early
clinical trials. The transformation from the medical community
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condoning impotence to treating over 23 million Americans with
Viagra is the result of a competitive market process.
V. Minoxidil’s “Harmless Side Effect”
The pharmaceutical company Upjohn first produced minoxidil in the
late 1960s. Although Upjohn executives originally planned for
minoxidil to treat respiratory issues, researchers quickly realized the
drug’s ability to combat hypertension during its animal testing phase.
Additional evidence of minoxidil’s ability to reduce blood pressure
was procured from further animal testing in the late 1960s. By 1971,
testing on humans began (Zins 1988). Another inadvertent discovery
was made during these clinical trials.
To the surprise of volunteers and researchers, minoxidil both
reduced blood pressure and stimulated hair growth in areas where a
topical solution was applied. Upjohn executives dismissed the
unexpected and unintended hair growth as “a harmless side effect”
(Bryan 2011, p. 1), and additional studies were conducted to
demonstrate minoxidil’s ability to combat hypertension (Nawar et al.
1977; Watkins et al. 1979). The FDA approved minoxidil under the
name Loniten in 1979.
While minoxidil provided effective treatment for hypertension,
news and excitement of its “harmless side effect” quickly spread. An
article featured in the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine
(Zappacosta 1980) highlighted minoxidil’s ability to stimulate hair
growth. This discovery led to further and more rigorous tests to
determine how effectively minoxidil could combat the effects of hair
loss and male pattern baldness.
At this time, the market for the treatment of hair loss (specifically
male pattern baldness) was largely unexplored. Anthony Chu,
professor of dermatology at Buckingham University in the United
Kingdom, described the market for the treatment for male pattern
baldness as “a wasteland, with predatory clinics [offering] spurious
remedies to vulnerable men at considerable costs” (Bryan 2011, p. 3).
As a result, men afflicted with male pattern baldness “were prepared
to try anything to make their hair grow back,” including “standing on
their heads to stimulate blood flow to the scalp” (Bryan 2011). The
market for hair restoration was a grand opportunity for physicians
and pharmaceutical companies to fill the needs of balding consumers.
Upjohn understood that “if it did not develop minoxidil as a hairrestorer, someone else would” (Bryan 2011).
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Scientific studies of minoxidil’s effectiveness in the treatment of
hair growth swiftly became part of the medical literature. In the
1980s, topical minoxidil was shown to increase terminal hair growth
in early male pattern baldness in 1 percent (Fenton and Wilkinson
1983), 2 percent, and 3 percent solutions (Olsen et al. 1985).
Minoxidil was also shown to be effective in treating the difficult case
of hereditary male pattern baldness (De Villez 1985; Savin 1987) and
maintained signs of effective treatment nearly five years after a
clinical trial (Olsen et al. 1990). These studies were conducted with
willing volunteers who “inundated” Upjohn’s headquarters hoping to
participate in a hair loss trail (Bryan 2011). By 1986, British
dermatologist Rodney Dawber noted, “Owing to the proliferation of
articles and programmes on the subject by the media, many patients
have attended their general practitioners and dermatology clinics
asking for information, and often demanding topical minoxidil
whatever the potential adverse consequences” (1986, p. 201).
Patients were serviced by entrepreneurial physicians much more
swiftly than they were by the FDA, which would finally approve
minoxidil oral tablets for the treatment of male pattern baldness in
1987. The topical 2 percent solution of minoxidil, known by its more
familiar name Rogaine, was approved in 1988, eight years after its
ability to effectively treat hair loss was highlighted in the New England
Journal of Medicine. Currently, minoxidil is one of only two drugs
approved by the FDA to treat male pattern baldness. Minoxidil has
also been effective in treating female pattern hair loss (Hoedemaker,
van Egmond, and Sinclair 2007; Blume-Peytavi et al. 2007).
Physicians and drug manufacturers exercising an entrepreneurial
role in using minoxidil to combat hair loss serviced a market in which
reliable treatment was previously unavailable. The testing and
repositioning of minoxidil illustrates pharmaceutical companies
acting to fill the needs of patients. Minoxidil is also an example of
knowledge and medical discovery obtained through the market
process outpacing FDA approval. Zins (1988, p. 132) summarizes the
story of minoxidil:
This, together with a more stringent surveillance by
government regulatory agencies, has increased the time
required to develop a newly discovered entity from a few
years in the 1950s and early 1960s to as much as 10–12 years
at the present time [Zins was writing in 1988]. In cases where
serendipitous discovery of new opportunities results in added
dimensions for pursuit, the time required is even greater. The
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development of minoxidil as an agent to reverse androgenetic
alopecia [pattern baldness], now being concluded after 27 years,
characterizes this more elaborate process. (emphasis added)
A condition as common as male pattern baldness provides a large
market for treatment options. The chemists of Upjohn and the
entrepreneurial dermatologists of the ‘70s and ‘80s provided this
treatment option while, as history would predict, the FDA was a
distant second to the medical community in recognizing beneficial
alternative uses of pharmaceuticals.
VI. Conclusion
Although the pharmaceutical market faces steep barriers to entry,
physicians can exercise an entrepreneurial role in the medical field
through prescribing and recommending approved medications for
uses that are not approved. The freedom of physicians to prescribe
medication off-label allows for an economic environment where
physicians compete to offer the best treatment available to the
patients they serve. Similarly, pharmaceutical companies act
entrepreneurially when they compete to find effective alternative uses
for approved pharmaceuticals. This competition in creating or
offering the best product for the consumer is the embodiment of the
discovery that occurs in the market process.
Aspirin’s impact on cardiovascular well-being, Viagra’s ability to
provide a simpler treatment option for impotence, and minoxidil’s
unexpected capacity to treat hair loss are three cases where
physicians’ and pharmaceutical companies’ alertness to patient need
provided more effective and desirable treatments than those
previously available. The knowledge generated through this market
process also provided products and information in a timelier manner
than the FDA approval process could. It is critical to note that these
case studies are not unique. Additional examples of commonly
accepted off-label uses of pharmaceuticals are provided in table 1.
Those who hold that drugs are prescribed off-label without
sufficient evidence or that they require additional governmental
oversight may not recognize the ability of the market process to
guide physicians and pharmaceutical companies to find effective and
safe alternative uses of pharmaceuticals. With the quality and
duration of life dependent on physicians’ ability to treat ailments,
conditions, and disorders, it is critically important to gain a more
thorough understanding of the merits of off-label drug use.
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Table 1. Common Off-Label Uses of Drugs*
Drug
Abilify

Original approved use
schizophrenia

Gabitril
Neurontin
Topamax

antiseizure
antiseizure
antiseizure

Lidoderm

shingles

Desyrel
Cymbalta
Botox

antidepressant
depression
wrinkles

Avastin
Topamax

metastatic cancers
antiseizure

Clonazepam

antiseizure

Latisse
Sertraline
Celebrex

glaucoma
antidepressant
joint sprain/strain

Procrit
Plaquenil
Prozac

chronic renal failure
malaria
depression

Albuterol
Singulair
Lamictal

Desyrel

asthma
asthma
epilepsy

depression

Off-label uses
dementia, Alzheimer’s disease

bad coughs
COPD
depression, bipolar disorder mood
stabilization
depression, mood stabilization
depression, nerve pain, migraines
migraines, bipolar disorder, depression,
nerve pain
lower back pain, sore muscles, tennis
elbow
insomnia
generalized anxiety disorder
stroke-induced muscle spasms, headaches,
juvenile cerebral palsy
macular degeneration
migraine prevention, weight loss, pain
management, alcoholism
restless leg syndrome, post-traumatic
stress disorder
lengthening eyelashes
premature ejaculation
fibromatosis
sleep disturbance, panic attacks, cocaine
withdrawal
anemia of chronic kidney disease
rheumatoid arthritis
premenstrual dysmorphic disorder

*Some of these drugs’ off-label uses have been approved by the FDA. Cymbalta
was approved to treat generalized anxiety disorder in 2007. Botox was approved to
treat chronic migraine and stroke-induced muscle spasms in 2010. Latisse was
approved to lengthen eyelashes in 2008. Topamax was first approved for the
preventive treatment of migraines in adolescents in 2014.

Although any treatment recommended by physicians contains
some risk, these risks may be better minimized when competition
and the market process are allowed guide physicians into making the
most of available resources to treat patients. Off-label prescription
has historically provided for this environment and will continue to
better the lives of patients if its unregulated practice is preserved.
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While this paper has examined evidence of the market process’s
ability to guide physicians and pharmaceutical companies to generate
information and provide effective treatment, it has not examined
external factors that may influence the decisions made by physicians
or pharmaceutical companies—for example, payments from
pharmaceutical companies might significantly influence prescribing
habits. It also has not examined some of the more controversial offlabel drug prescriptions and uses including uses to treat children
(Dörks et al. 2013; Kimland and Odlind 2014) and patients with
mental illnesses (Haw and Stubbs 2005; Radley, Finkelstien, and
Stafford 2006). Further research conducted on these issues is
recommended to expand the knowledge of how off-label prescription
and use benefits patients.
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